One post-attack event claim involves a single IDF (Israel Defense Force) Navy MTB (motor torpedo boat) approaching USS Liberty to signal an offer of assistance. There is no dispute about this event’s occurrence, but its timing is disputed. This essay will explore various bits-and-pieces of documentary and testimony evidence in an attempt discover the true time for this event.
Fundamentally, there are two different claims about the timing of the assistance signaling event. The IDF History Report about the attack, states:
“GOI [Government of Israel] Navy instructed the [MTB] Division commander to approach the ship and offer assistance over the loudspeaker …The [MTB] Division [commander’s boat] approached the ship at 1640 hours and was able to discern the ship's name. The [MTB] Division's offer of assistance was immediately rejected…”
This timing claim is at odds with U.S. NCOI (Navy Court of Inquiry) Finding of Fact number 21:
“Thirty minutes after attacking LIBERTY the MTBs signalled in English, ‘Do you need help?’”
No clock time was stated in the NCOI finding, but according to Captain McGonagle’s NCOI testimony, the offer of assistance occurred relatively soon after the torpedo blast. The time written in USS Liberty’s Deck Log was 1503.[1]
Clearly, there is a vast difference (about 1.6 hours) between the times 1503 and 1640. Thus, this is not simply a matter of two clocks being a few minutes out of synchronization; rather, it is a gross variance in timeline – implying that one or both accounts of the event’s timing are grossly incorrect.
Since official and validated copies of NCOI testimony and the ship’s logs are available, perhaps taking a close look at these documents will help determine the true time for this event.
Let’s begin by reading and analyzing Captain McGonalge’s NCOI testimony:
“Immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo, the torpedo boats stopped dead in the water and milled around astern of the ship at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signaled by flashing light, in English, 'Do you require assistance?' We had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted code Lima India. The signal intended to convey the fact that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty and that they should keep clear. ...”
At first reading, McGonagle's testimony does not appear to offer much information for determining time. Although, it leaves the impression that the MTBs “milled around astern” for perhaps 10 or 15 minutes, after the torpedo hit (about 1435), and then came forward to signal an offer of assistance. Thus, this testimony appears to fit well with the 1503 time cited in USS Liberty's Deck Log.
On second reading, you should note that two different and sequential signaling events were claimed in McGonagle’s testimony: the offer of assistance signaling from the MTB’s, followed by the USS Liberty’s hoisting of signal flags Lima India. Additionally, note that McGonagle said nothing about issuing a rejection message -- he only recalled there being "no means to communicate with the boat by light."
Both the Underway Log and QM (Quartermater's) Notebook[2] contain entries about hoisting signal flags Lima Inida:
Underway Log 1539: “HOISTING CODE LIMA INDIA”.QM Notebook 1540: “RAISED CODE LIMA INDIA - NOT UNDER COMMAND”.[3]
Perhaps NCOI testimony by other witnesses might provide an answer. The following quotes (with emphasis added) are from testimony by Ensign Lucas and Chief Petty Officer Thompson.
Ensign Lucas: " [After the torpedo boat firing ended,] ...the patrol craft [boats] were bearing approximately 160 relative. One of them was trying to signal us [by light]. The smoke from the [burning] motor whaleboat almost completely obscured the patrol craft from us. ... None of us were able to determine what the [light] signaling was -- the smoke was too intense. Shortly after that, another patrol craft approached us from the starboard side and did manage to get clear of the smoke. The Signalman [David] took the message, 'Do you need help?'. The Commanding Officer [McGonagle] told Signalman David to give a negative reply. ... To the best of my recollection the people on the bridge were the Commanding Officer [McGonagle], Signalman David and a Chief Petty Officer Thompson."
Chief Petty Officer Thompson: "[After the torpedo boat firing ended,]...I was asked to report to the bridge, which I did. When I got up there, Signalman David was attempting to rig a hand light. I assisted him. We went to the starboard wing of the bridge and one torpedo boat was making a run straight at us off the starboard beam while the other two stood off. At the Captain's directions, David sent 'US Naval Ship' 'US Naval Ship.' When they were about 500 yards off, the torpedo boat turned astern and came up on the stern on the starboard side and flashed, 'Do you need help?'... The Captain was giving us word. He said, 'No, thank you.' We sent this back to the boat, and our steering was somewhat erratic and they came up on the port side then. David went across, I followed him, and saw on the last part of that message, David said, 'Do you want us to standby?' I passed this word to the Captain. He said, 'No, thank you.' We sent this to the patrol boat. [The boat] came up along port side, I say roughly 100 yards off, flashed 'Good luck' and dropped astern along with the other two [boats] which had come up to the stern, to a mile or a mile and a half back, just about out of sight. Then they made one high speed run directly astern and somewhere between a quarter and a half mile back made a U-turn and disappeared."
Essentially, Lucas and Thompson recalled the assistance offer signaling event identically, with Thompson recalling significantly more detail than Lucas -- likely because he participated directly in the event. But unlike McGonagle, Lucas and Thompson implied or recalled, respectively, a means (hand-held signal light) was available for communicating with the MTBs; and both Lucas and Thompson recalled that a rejection message -- issued by McGonagle -- was sent to the MTBs.
This greater insight into details of the signaling event is helpful, and sheds light on Captain McGonagle's inconsistent recall of the event; but, unfortunately, neither Ensign Lucas or Chief Thompson provided specific times for the event; although, according to Thompson, it occurred shortly before the MTBs departed the area.
Returning to the log books, both the Underway Log and QM Notebook indicate the MTBs were not very close to the ship at times near 1540 (i.e., the Lima India signal flag event time), but at about 1630 one MTB closely approached the ship -- close enough to see clearly its hull identification number (204), gun configuration and Israeli flag. There is no mention in either log about an offer of assistance being issued at this time or any other time. The last entry about MTBs appears at 1648 in the Underway Log, and 1713 in the QM notebook. The log entries state, respectively: "THREE GUN BOATS HAVE TURNED AWAY", and "TORPEDO BOATS PREVIOUSLY LOGGED NOW OUT OF SIGHT".
Coupling the above cited logs' entries and times with Thompson's detailed testimony, Lucas' supporting testimony, and dismissing McGonagle's inconsistent testimony, tells us that the IDF's assistance offer likely occurred sometime between about 1630 and 1648; although, it was via signal light, not loudspeaker as claimed.
In conclusion, the above documentary and NCOI testimony evidence supports strongly the IDF’s claim of an assistance offer being issued at or near 1640 (about two hours after the torpedo hit); thus, this finding refutes Captain McGonagle's related NCOI testimony, the corresponding entry in USS Liberty’s Deck Log, and the NCOI's Finding of Fact number 21.