Attack events between 1355 to 1446 were not recorded in USS Liberty's QM (Quartermaster's) Notebook -- the primary document used to write the Deck Log -- and several events recorded after 1446 were somewhat sketchy or vague. Thus, the NCOI (Navy Court of Inquiry) had to reconstruct the chain of events, during the attack, mostly from NCOI testimony and information found the ship's other logs (e.g., Underway Log). This fact is acknowledged in NCOI Finding 49:
"... It was necessary to reconstruct time sequences, because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to 1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack."
A careful study of NCOI testimony and findings revealed that Captain McGonalge's testimony formed the basis -- almost word-for-word -- for reconstructing the attack's chain of events, as manifested in NOCI findings numbered 5, 20, 21, 25, 26 and 27. This occurred despite the fact that creditable testimony by others (e.g., Ensign Lucas) conflicted significantly with the Captain's testimony.[1]
So, considering the NCOI's great reliance on the Captain's testimony, and faced with conflicting testimony by others, it is critical to discover its accuracy; i.e., was it a reliable source for determining the sequence of attack events?
To do this, the following typical example of the many questionable statements in Captain McGonagle NCOI testimony will be examined:
"In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles."
It is clear from photographs taken during the attack and SIGINT (signal intelligence) of the IAF's (Israel Air Force) rescue helicopters that USS Liberty headed north during the air attack.[1,2] Thus, if the MTBs (motor torpedo boats) approached from 135 degrees relative, near the end of the air attack, then they approached from the southeast -- not the northeast as McGonagle testified.
Also, during the latter moments of the air attack, USS Liberty's radar was not working, due to antenna damage, according to NCOI testimony of Ensign Lucas and Ensign 0 'Malley, the CIC (Combat Information Center) officer.[3] Thus, by this time, it was impossible to see the MTBs on radar; and it was only marginally possible (assuming binoculars, ideal visibility, and knowledge of exact bearing) for anybody on USS Liberty's upper decks to see any part of the relatively small MTBs at about 15 nautical miles -- let alone attempt to accurately judge their distance, without the aid of radar, while under air attack.
Further, if the MTBs were spotted at 15 nautical miles from the ship, it would have taken them about 30 minutes to reach the ship at 30 knots average speed. Thus, assuming conservatively the latter part of the air attack was at about 1410, then it would have been about 1435 when the MTBs arrived, several miles from the ship, to begin their shelling and torpedo attack. But by 1435 the MTB attack was well underway, the torpedo attack performed, and a torpedo had hit the ship; thus, the MTBs could not have been 15 miles from the ship during the latter part of the air attack.
Interestingly, the Underway Log contains an entry about MTBs being sighted, at the end of the air attack, at 1424. But, as you can see below, no bearing was entered.
Perhaps this was the sighting that Captain McGonagle recalled. But as subsequent MTB related event times imply, the MTBs were much closer than 15 nautical miles.
From the above analysis, it is clear that Captain McGonagle's sample testimony -- quoted above -- was erroneous. Likely, McGonagle confused events before the air attack with events during the air attack. In other words, the MTBs were spotted, at a 15 nautical miles distance, on USS Liberty's radar immediately before the air attack, while she was on a 283 (westward) heading, not during the latter moments of the air attack, as she headed northward.[1,2] Thus, a 135 relative bearing would place the MTBs coming from the northeast -- as McGonagle recalled -- but before the air attack, not during the latter moments of the air attack.
Generally, throughout Captain McGonagle's NCOI testimony about events during the attack, but not before the attack, there is a pattern of confused event timing and outright misstatements, as revealed above and in several other essays.[1,4,5] Thus, when all is considered, McGonagle's testimony about events during the attack shows itself as being unreliable; and, accordingly, any investigation or document (e.g., NCOI findings and derivative reports) that depends on McGonagle's testimony for its findings or statements about events during the attack is equally unreliable.